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The article argues that Ostroms’ institutionalism has a dimension that is complex and profound enough
to deserve to be considered a “social theory” or a “social philosophy.” The article pivots around the
thesis that the “social philosophy” behind the Bloomington School’s research agenda has in fact two
facets that may or may not be consistent with each other. The article describes the main features of the
two facets, offers a brief overview of the development of these ideas, and clarifies their relationship to
Public Choice theory and alternative visions of public goods analysis, public administration, and
governance. The argument goes further to raise the provocative question whether the two “social
philosophies” involved in the approach undertaken by Elinor Ostrom and Vincent Ostrom are neces-
sarily and inseparably connected with the rest of their research program.
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1. Introduction
More often than not Bloomington institutionalism is seen in a narrow way, i.e.,
only in relationship to the common pool resources studies, which are, indeed, very
salient, yet, in fact, only one of the many dimensions of this research program. The
reality is that the study of the “commons” emerged from a broader and deeper
intellectual perspective that frames at a foundational level the work of the Blooming-
ton scholars. As such, it is only one of the ways in which this intellectual vision
becomes operational in the research practice. A closer look at this “perspective”
reveals the fact that it is complex and profound enough to deserve to be considered
what the literature calls a “social theory” or a “social philosophy.” Both explicit and
implicit in the Ostroms’ work are attempts to understand, chart, evaluate, and articu-
late the basic categories with which we think about the social aspects of human life, as
well as a willingness to deal with philosophical questions about social order and
social behavior. Encapsulated in their studies are views about the nature and desir-
ability of alternative systems of social organization and an effort toward their
philosophical understanding. Even more, their empirical and policy-relevant contri-
butions could be positioned in a very telling way at the intersection of several major
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trends in modern social thinking. Such exercises in interpretation reveal that the
Ostroms’ contributions not only have a well-defined place in this intellectual history
context but also that, in many respects, their originality transcends the standard
schools of thought and disciplinary boundaries. To focus only on the more salient and
publicly visible pieces of the research produced by the Bloomington scholars—such
as those on “governance” and “commons”—would be to miss an important part of
the Ostroms’ perspective on social order and institutionalism. If that is the case, it is
understandable why a discussion dedicated to the IAD framework—a central ana-
lytical instrument in the toolbox of the Bloomington School—has only to gain from a
detour through the broarder intellectual perspective that has induced its creation,
defined its context, and inspired its most important applications.
The main objective of this article is to explore this broader “perspective” that
we shall call the “social theory” or the “social philosophy” that presumably shapes,
inspires, and defines the Ostroms’ research program. Our task is not just descriptive.
The article pivots around the argument that what we have called the “social philoso-
phy” behind the Bloomington School’s research agenda has in fact two facets that may
or may not be consistent with each other. Even more, they may or may not be
necessarily and inseparably connected with the rest of the program. The first is built
around the concept of “polycentricity” and a series of Public Choice insights, and is a
challenge to two of the deepest assumptions of political and economic sciences
in the twentieth century: the monocentric vision of social order and the “market”
vs. “state” dichotomy. The second is built around a view of social order seen as a
knowledge and learning process, along with a series of observations about the human
condition, fallibility, coercion, and error as well as about the factors engendering
institutional order as a response to the challenges posed by them. But irrespective of
how we approach and consider the relationship between these two facets, one thing is
clear and stays unchanged: both feature an unambiguous normative engagement on
behalf of self-governance and a robust faith in human freedom and human ingenuity.
2. A Social Theory of Polycentrism
The easiest way to start exploring the Bloomington School’s social philosophy is
to use as a vehicle the argument made by V. Ostrom’s (1971) book on the crisis in
American public administration. Thus one could not only outline the basic elements
of the most salient facet or dimension but also place the School on an intellectual
history background. The growth of a “science of politics” on the lines defined by
Hobbes, Hume, Smith, and Tocqueville, argued Ostrom, was derailed by the twen-
tieth century views about the nature of political inquiry. Political science had
adopted the wrong paradigm. A different paradigm, an alternative way of looking at
the social and political world, was needed.
2.1 A Challenge to Woodrow Wilson’s Power-focused Monocentrism
Vincent Ostrom’s book on The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration
contained a powerful elaboration of the idea of an initial paradigm change that was
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supposed to be challenged by yet another, new paradigm change effort. Its starting
point was the observation that “the profession no longer has confidence in what it
professes.” The problem was in the end practical, not just theoretical and academic.
Thus, urban issues, environmental crises, and race problems seemed without solu-
tion or at least that administrative and policy theory had no solution to offer. The
cause, he argued, was, in a nutshell, the fact that political science and administrative
theory were excessively shaped by a state-centric, “monocentric” vision. This view
assumed a bureaucratic paradigm, centralized control, homogeneity of administra-
tive structures, and the separation of the political from the administrative. As such,
it neglected two important aspects of public organization. First, different circum-
stances require different decision-making structures. Second, multi-organizational
arrangements might be possible within the same administrative systems. The
bureaucratic paradigm was framing both the analytical and practical approaches in
ways that not only were unable to offer solutions but were unable to even identify
problems. Seeking an alternative was a vital task.
The monocentric vision, focusing on “the state” and “seeing like a state” and
assuming the existence of a unique center of power and authority, was so deeply
rooted in the practice of social sciences, that by the time the Ostroms started their
intellectual assault, it seemed commonsensical. Yet, the Ostroms challenged the
conventional wisdom and while criticizing it, they built an alternative (E. Ostrom,
1972; V. Ostrom, Bish, & E. Ostrom, 1988). And thus, we turn to “polycentricity” as
a central concept in the architecture of the Bloomington system. The reference point
in their endeavour was, interestingly enough, Woodrow Wilson. The decision to
identify the paradigmatic case of the monocentric philosophy in Wilson’s work may
seem idiosyncratic. But the more one advances in understanding the nature of the
Ostrom criticism of Wilsonian assumptions, the more one realizes how inspired and
appropriate was the choice of the paradigmatic target. Needless to say, in between the
lines of this criticism, was a revisionist intellectual history of political and policy
sciences in the twentieth century.
As Ostrom (1971) explains in his The Intellectual Crisis in American Public
Administration the Wilsonian analysis marked an important paradigm shift in
American political science. One of the main dimensions of that shift was in terms
of understanding the U.S. political system, a dimension that went beyond the mere
notion of efficient administration through the rule of experts, the better known
Wilsonian stance. Wilson’s assumption that “there is always a single center of
power in any political system” was accepted as a basic postulate by many, even if
that gave them an obviously distorted perspective. Due to it, their attention was
obsessively concentrated on the “central” level. All other levels and forms of gov-
ernance and association were neglected or considered marginal if they were not
directly linked or associated with the “system of government” and its “center of
power.” The insights given by authors such as Tocqueville (whose work that was
a constant source of inspiration for the Ostroms) were lost. Features that were
considered of such salience and importance in his classical analysis were ignored.
“The incommensurabilities between Tocqueville’s portrayal of democracy in
America and Wilson’s portrayal were of radical proportions even though only fifty
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years intervened between those two presentations” (Ostrom, 1971, pp. 20–23;
1991a, 1991b, p. 5).
“Visions” frame the perception of reality, and different visions imply different
analytical approaches. Because the entire Wilsonian approach is based on the notion
that “there is always a centre of power . . . within any system of government”
(Wilson, 1956 [1885], p. 30), the issue of the location and application of power is
shaping the focus and the vocabulary of the monocentric approach. The entire
exercise comes to be power-centered in ways that may become extreme and limiting.
Choices, decisions, rules, preferences, ideas, values become secondary. They are just
inputs or outputs in the power process or, even worse, a “veil” that is clouding the
view of “reality” (i.e., power and its workings) (V. Ostrom, 1972, 1991b, 1993b).
These analytical implications of the monocentric approach constituted a major
concern for the Ostroms. Their fear was that even when not explicitly dealing with
the issue of power, this vision had deeply penetrated and shaped the language of
political sciences. Most of political analysis was infused or defined by its hidden
assumptions, its implicit social philosophy, and by its language. Hence, a concern
not only for the limits and the dangers of the mainstream approach but also for the
fact that once the monocentric presumption was abandoned, one was confronted
with difficulties arising from an entirely new horizon of complexities that evade the
mainstream vocabulary. It was obvious that an approach based on a polycentric
vision could not rely on the convenient predefinition of the research agenda in terms
of “power” or on using “government” or “state” as the key unit of analysis. An
alternative should be constructed, “suggesting that a system of ordered relationships
underlies the fragmentation of authority and overlapping jurisdictions that had
frequently been identified as chaotic″: a polycentric political system viewed as “a set
of ordered relationships that persists through time” and “having many centers of
decision making that are formally independent of each other” (V. Ostrom [1972] in
McGinnis, 1999b, p. 53).
Before and after being operationalized and subject to an empirical agenda, the
notion of polycentricity belongs to the realm of social philosophy. In the alternative
paradigm advanced by the Ostroms, the government as a basic unit becomes sec-
ondary and the individuals and their “action arenas” take the forefront of the
analysis (V. Ostrom, 1982, pp. 1–2; 1982b, 1991b, 1993b). This approach combines a
theory of human action with a theory of social organization drawing upon “a
substantial structure of inferential reasoning about the consequences that will
follow when individuals pursue strategies consistent with their interests in light of
different types of decision structures in order to realize opportunities inherent in
differently structured sets of events” (V. Ostrom [1972] in McGinnis, 1999b, pp.
52–75, 119–139). In other words, the Ostroms suggest a different vision that at its
turn implies and fuels a different analytical approach: reframing the issues from
one center to many, and from there even further, to the concrete actions of the
social actors.
At this juncture, one needs to draw attention to an additional specific aspect of
the anti-Wilsonian stance of the Bloomington scholars’ approach. This aspect is an
extension of an observation of disarming simplicity: human beings “rely upon ideas
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and knowable regularities” to create “social artifacts.” Ideas, knowable regularities,
and informed practices are part and parcel of political realities. It is hard even to
conceive political order if you do not assume that people “create their own social
realities by reference to some shared community of understanding (pictures in their
minds) and live their lives within those realities as artifactual creations.” If that was
the case, then there was no doubt that the most serious mistake in the social sciences
was to ignore this aspect of the ontology of the social order, i.e., the role of “ideas,
conjectures about regularities, and the careful use of informed practices that are
constitutive of that reality” (V. Ostrom, 1991b, p. 11). We will explore later in the
article this issue—i.e., how a theory of social order based on the role of ideas,
knowledge, and learning may shape up.
For now it is important to note the relationship between this observation and the
criticism of the Wilsonian paradigm. Woodrow Wilson’s (1956) classical contention
that a “constitution in operation” is a very different thing from the “constitution of
the books” was for V. Ostrom also an indication of a turning point in the history of
modern political thinking. The two constitutions may be different by definition but
that does not mean in any way that the “constitution of the books” is irrelevant. That
was the reason why Wilson’s work was used persistently to illustrate the errors of the
mainstream and to pinpoint the moment when the move toward dismissing and
marginalizing the role of ideas gained real strength. V. Ostrom was convinced of its
paradigm-change nature not only because its radical and aggressive monocentrism,
but also because of its stance on the role of ideas. The two issues, monocentrism and
the rejection of role of institutional design ideas (and ideas in general) were related.
Normally, they may not be; but in the case in point, they were intrinsically connected.
They were the basic elements of the historic intellectual shift challenged, at its turn,
by the Ostroms.
As a result of this shift the distinction between “institutional facts” and
“natural” or “brute facts” was lost and lost, too, was the intricate dynamics that
takes place between ideas-rules-decisions-learning that drives social change. Treat-
ing ideas as “paper pictures,” which concealed the reality of politics, also meant
that a major preoccupation of social scientists was the development of methods to
penetrate those pictures and disperse them in order to understand the “living
reality” behind them. And because ideas were not taken seriously, institutional
change by design, and institutional theory, were not seriously considered (V.
Ostrom, 1971, pp. 10–11; 1980, 1986, 1990, 1991a, 1993a, 1993b).
To sum up, the polycentric perspective comes as more than a mere challenge;
it is, by all standards, the pivot of an entirely new viewpoint and a new conceptual
construction. The criticism of the Wilsonian approach, and its analytical and meth-
odological implication, amounts to sketching an alternative to them. The emerging
social philosophy has important implications for analysis. Multiple centers of
power, overlapping in competition and cooperation, individuals acting in specifi-
cally defined social and institutional settings—ecological rationality, emphasis on
dynamics that takes place between ideas-rules-decisions-learning. All these as part
of an effort to reject the vision behind the (Wilsonian) mainstream approach and
indeed as an attempt to contribute to the growth of an alternative to it.
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2.2 Public Choice and “The Great Divide”
In order to become a real contender, the polycentrism vision needed to be
bolstered by a flexible conceptual framework with a robust analytical apparatus. That
was to be found by the Ostroms in the work of “those political economists concerned
with institutional weaknesses and institutional failures in non-market economies.” By
comparing and contrasting the approach of, on the one hand, these political econo-
mists and, on the other hand, of bureaucratic theorists of the Weber-Wilson school,
the Ostroms concluded that the political economy, more precisely, the Public Choice
approach, “yielded the insights” able to revive political sciences. Public Choice, they
noted, asked the right questions that pointed out the crucial issue of choice among
forms of organization, institutional frameworks, or systems of rules. The crucial
implication was that there is no one organization or institutional arrangement that is
“good” in all circumstances. The goal of a wise policy is to search for the arrange-
ment, which “minimizes the cost associated with institutional weaknesses or insti-
tutional failure.” Public Choice has the capacity to lead to a pluralistic theory of
organizational life and of institutional arrangements. That, they concluded, made it
the best set of ideas around that could also lead (once juxtaposed on the polycen-
tricity framework) to the reconstruction of a paradigm for political sciences in the
twentieth century.
In this discussion, one must always keep in mind that Elinor Ostrom and Vincent
Ostrom V. Ostrom, 1971; V. Ostrom & E. Ostrom, 1977; Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren,
1961 are foundational contributors to the Public Choice School. Even more, both
were elected, at one point or another, presidents of the Public Choice Society. One
could hardly exaggerate their involvement in the Public Choice movement. But the
Ostroms went further than contributing to the ordinary Public Choice agenda. In
fact, their contribution was entirely original, as it opened up a new horizon, not only
in Public Choice but also in traditional political and policy sciences. In order to see
the groundbreaking dimension, one has to go back to the basic dichotomy of modern
political sciences, “states vs. markets” and the corresponding “market failure” vs.
“state failure” theories.
Let’s take as a starting point the conventional wisdom. Typically, when econo-
mists show that market arrangements fail, they usually make the simple recom-
mendation that “the” state should take care of these problems. The Ostroms
demonstrated empirically that “the” state may not be “the” solution. Their work
argues for the wisdom of institutional diversity, looking to individuals to solve
problems rather than relying on top down, one-size-fits-all solutions. For instance,
the conventional wisdom assumes that natural resources and environmental prob-
lems should be solved in a centralized—and if possible, global—manner. Through
innovative analysis in the field, in the experimental laboratory, and in theory, E.
Ostrom’s work has show that creative solutions to problems such as the depletion of
common pool resources exist outside of the sphere of national governments. Hence,
the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences.
But there is more to be read in that work in this respect. The most important is
that the Ostroms mounted a remarkable challenge to the mainstream views in
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economics and political science, indeed. As E. Ostrom (1996, 1998, 2000) described it
herself, her work is a systematic attempt to transcend the basic dichotomy of modern
political economy. On the one hand, there is the tradition defined by Adam Smith’s
theory of social order. Adam Smith and his intellectual descendants, focused on the
pattern of order and the positive consequences emerging out of the independent
actions of individuals pursuing their own interests within a given system of rules.
That was the “spontaneous order” tradition where the study of markets—the com-
petition among producers and consumers of pure private goods leading to a better
allocation of resources—occupied a preeminent place. On the other hand, there is the
tradition rooted in Thomas Hobbes’s theory of social order. From that perspective,
individual actors, pursuing their own interests and trying to maximize their welfare,
lead inevitably to chaos and conflict. From that possibility is derived the necessity of
a single center of power imposing order. In that view, social order is the creation of
the unique “Leviathan,” which wields the monopoly power to make and enforce law.
Self-organized and independent individuals thus have nothing to do with making
order.
The Ostrom view is that the theorists in both traditions managed to keep not only
the theories of market and state alienated from each other, they also managed to keep
the basic social philosophy visions of the two separated. Smith’s concept of market
order was considered applicable for all private goods, while Hobbes’s conception of
the single center of power and decision applied for all collective goods. But what if
the domains of modern political-economic life could not be understood or organized
by relying only on the concepts of markets or states? What if we need ″a richer set of
policy formulations″ than just ″the″ market or ″the″ state? Answering that challenge
is probably the best way to see the Ostroms’ work, be it on policentricity, governance,
or common pool resources: A theoretically informed, empirically based contribution
to a larger and bolder attempt to build an alternative to the basic dichotomy of
modern political economy, an effort to find an alternative to the conceptions derived
from Smith and Hobbes.
“The presence of order in the world,” E. Ostrom (1998) writes, “is largely depen-
dent upon the theories used to understand the world. We should not be limited,
however, to only the conceptions of order derived from the work of Smith and
Hobbes.” We need a theory that “offers an alternative that can be used to analyze and
prescribe a variety of institutional arrangements to match the extensive variety of
collective goods in the world.” In response to that need, the Ostroms have explored
a new domain of the complex institutional reality of social life—the rich institutional
arrangements that are neither states nor markets. They are small and large, multi-
purpose or just focused on one good or service: suburban municipalities, neighbor-
hood organizations, condominiums, churches, voluntary associations, or informal
entities like those solving the common-pool resources dilemmas they studied and
documented around the world. Yet, once the functional principle behind them was
identified, the very diverse forms could be understood as part of a broader pattern,
and the logic of the institutional process involved could be revealed with relative
ease. They could be seen as a “third sector” (“public economy” was one of the
suggested names for it) related to, but different from, both “the state” and “the
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market.” Irrespective of what we call these domains, the fact is that a theoretical
perspective that takes it into account is substantially different from the one based on
the classical dichotomy.
If that is the case, then we are now in the position to place the work of the
Ostroms in the Public Choice context and, with that, to reveal more about the specific
social theory they advanced. Together with authors like James Buchanan or Gordon
Tullock, the Ostroms are among those thinkers who looked at the proposition
“Markets fail, therefore the state is the solution” and “States fail, therefore the market
is the solution,” not through the lenses of fashionable academic doctrines or the
ideologies of the day, but through the lenses of logic and empirical evidence. As E.
Ostrom put it, “Showing that one institutional arrangement leads to suboptimal
performance is not equivalent, however, to showing that another institutional
arrangement will perform better.” But the Ostroms went beyond the Buchanan and
Tullock demonstration of the fact that in numerous cases the state is far from being
“the solution.” Buchanan and Tullock argue convincingly that state failure is even
more systematic and perverse than market failure. Now, with the Public Choice
theory of Buchanan and Tullock, we had a theory of state failure. The State’s effi-
ciency must be proved, not postulated.
The Ostroms took all that a step further. However, their emphasis was not on the
“bad news” but on the “good news.” Their work demonstrated that, even when we
talk about public goods and services that the market cannot supply (and the state
pretends to supply efficiently) people can develop complex institutional arrange-
ments in order to produce and distribute precisely those goods and services. That
people can solve complex cooperation and coordination problems of governance,
without the state being involved in any way. They discovered for instance the pos-
sibility of conceiving a situation when the units of government were “collective
consumption units” whose first order of business is to articulate and aggregate
demands for those goods that are subject to joint consumption where exclusion is
difficult to attain. In that specific situation relationships are coordinated among
collective consumption and production units by contractual agreements, cooperative
arrangements, competitive rivalry, and mechanisms of conflict resolution. No single
center of authority is responsible for coordinating all relationships in such a “public
economy.” Market-like mechanisms can develop competitive pressures that tend to
generate higher efficiency than can be gained by enterprises organized as exclusive
monopolies and managed by elaborate hierarchies of officials (Ostrom and Ostrom
[1977] in McGinnis, 1999b, p. 99).
Moreover, the investigations revealed a whole series of cases wherein the col-
laboration between those who supplied a service and those who used it was the
factor determining the effective delivery of the service—i.e., that in many instances
the users of services also function as co-producers. Without the informed and moti-
vated efforts of service users “the service may deteriorate into an indifferent product
with insignificant value” (Ostrom & Ostrom [1977] in McGinnis, 1999b, p. 93). Pro-
duction was not separated from consumption. Instead (the client or consumer) was
part of the production process, consumer’s input being essential “if there was to be
any production at all.” Co-production means more than the existence of at least two
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producers; it means the existence of two types of producers, a regular and a
consumer producer, who “mix their efforts.” Therefore, “the resources, motivations,
and skills brought to bear by the client or consumer are much more intimately
connected with the level of achieved output than in the case of goods production.”
The organization of a public economy that “gives consideration to economies of
consumption as well as of production and provides for the co-ordination of the two
is most likely to attain the best results” (Ostrom & Ostrom [1977] in McGinnis, 1999b,
p. 94). Co-production problems could be identified in many sub-domains of the
service industries in both the private and public sectors. The metropolitan areas were
salient because they just offered a high concentration of very extreme and obvious
cases.
The notion of “public economy” was meant to accomplish two goals: To save the
concept of “public” from the false notion that “public” meant “the State” and “cen-
tralized systems of governance” and to make clear the difference from the market
economy. In other words, to show that it is possible to have systems that are neither
markets nor states, and which preserve the autonomy and the freedom of choice of
the individual (Ostrom & Ostrom [1977] in McGinnis, 1999b, p. 76). A new perspec-
tive on the institutional structures of that type was opened. A complex system was
revealed in which not only markets and hierarchies but also more hybrid and
peculiar arrangements were combined to generate a special institutional architec-
ture. Until then, the private sector (associated to market transactions and competi-
tion) and the public sector (associated to governmental administration and with a
bureaucratic system) were viewed as two mutually exclusive parts of the economy.
Not anymore. Public economies, building blocks or areas of polycentrism, are dif-
ferent from state economies but also are different from market economies. That is
indeed, by any standard, a radical change of perspective.
All of the above abundantly justifies the claim that an entire research program,
based on a fresh vision and with its distinct social philosophy (or social theory) has
emerged offering an alternative and original vision of social order. We could see how
the Bloomington School grew and consolidated challenging at the same time both
the monocentric perspective and the market vs. state dichotomy. In other words, it
did that by challenging nothing less than two of the deepest and far-reaching
assumptions of political and economic sciences in the twentieth century.
3. A Social Theory of Institutional Order as a Knowledge Process
The previous section illustrates why even if it would be limited to the themes
and perspectives surrounding the concept of polycentricity, the Ostrom research
program would imply and engender a rich and challenging social philosophy. At the
same time, the section illuminates the context in which the IAD framework was
imagined and developed as a conceptual instrument meant to guide the analytical
effort through the complexities of the diversity of polycentric institutional arrange-
ments. But to make things even more complex and intriguing, there is a second facet
(or an additional dimension) to the underlying social theory or philosophy of the
Bloomington school. We have seen how its first facet grows around polycentricity
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and Public Choice while maintaining itself in some measure close to the general tone
of the standard neoclassical economics approach (albeit in a way full of heterodox
nuances and strides). The other facet goes even further away from orthodoxies. It is
nothing less than a tentative social philosophy of institutional order, seen as a
knowledge and information process, nuanced by an almost existentialist concern for
the “human condition” and its limitations.
3.1 Human Nature, Choice, Institutions
To unveil the sources of the second dimension of the social theory behind the
Bloomington agenda, one needs to go back to a series of papers written by V.
Ostrom in the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, in an attempt to crystallize his
views on the problem of social order. From this second perspective, the starting
point of the study of social order does not rest in a formal definition of rationality,
as many of the fellow Public Choice and new institutionalist scholars suggested,
but in an anthropological and historical understanding of “the human condition
and what it is about that condition that disposes human beings to search out
arrangements with one another that depend upon organization” (V. Ostrom, 1982,
1984). In the picture emerging out of the series of stylized facts reflecting that
understanding, the first key element is choice. Nonetheless, the view on choice
differs from the one advanced by the standard rational choice paradigm. Its basis
is not formal or axiomatic but philosophical, in the broad, one may say, classical
sense of the word.
The argument is shaped by a bold ontological assertion that choice is the basic
and defining element for both humans and the social order they create.
Choice—loosely defined as being able to consider alternative possibilities and to
select a course of action from among a range of such possibilities—is not only a
fundamental part of human behavior, but also the source of social order and social
change. From an evolutionary standpoint, choice could be seen as a particular form
of selection: alternative possibilities are assessed and compared. The more diverse
and better defined the possibilities, the better founded the choice will be. The better
the choice, the better the adaptation. And because choice is a basic form of adaptive
behavior, social organization could be seen as the expression of choice as a form of
adaptive behavior. Up to this point, this is more or less a standard evolutionary
account.
Yet, argues V. Ostrom, the cycle of adaptation does not stop there: organization
solves problems but also creates new problems. Humans have to adjust to them
through learning and new choices. We should not bypass this side of the story.
Rather, a special emphasis should be placed on this point. The very solutions create,
at their turn, new problems and challenges. And thus the cycle is continued through
the dialectic problem-solution-new problem . . . Social organizations get more and
more complex. Yet, precisely because it is the outcome of choice and it is engendering
new choices, social organization is always fluid and vulnerable to ongoing chal-
lenges. Out of the many possible challenges, in the end, the most important are not
external but could be traced back to human nature itself:
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Any creature that has unique capabilities for learning and generating new
knowledge inevitably faces an uncertain future. Learning and the generation
of new knowledge are themselves marks of fallibility. Infallible creatures
would have no need to learn and generate new knowledge. Fallible creatures
need to accommodate their plans to changing levels of information and
knowledge. (V. Ostrom [1980] in McGinnis, 1999a, p. 382)
Fallibility, uncertainty, ignorance, learning, and adaptability become thus key
concepts in this stylized narrative of social order: “An appreciation of the tenuous
nature of order in human society is the most important lesson to be learned about the
human condition,” writes V. Ostrom (1982, p. 3; 1973, 1986). In the end, the source of
vulnerability of humans’ social arrangements could be found in the same forces that
generate their dynamic resilience. This is indeed a profound paradox and an inex-
haustible source of social dilemmas.
These are, at a very basic and oversimplified level, the most elemental param-
eters of the other facet of the Bloomington social philosophy. Further elaborating
beyond them reveals the fine links that connect a theory of choice to a theory of rules
and institutions via a theory of learning, knowledge, and ideas. A pivotal element in
this narrative is that language radically amplifies human capabilities to shape ideas,
to accumulate and transmit knowledge. With language, the fact of choice is pro-
foundly affected too. With language, the power of choice increases in an unprec-
edented and unique way in evolutionary history (V. Ostrom, 1982, pp. 7–11). But the
increase of options (imagined or real) makes the act of choice daunting. To coordi-
nate, cooperate, and work through the looming chaos and structural uncertainty,
rules and their institutionalization are needed. In the absence of such heuristic
devices that diminish the diversity of possibilities, economize and focus cognitive
effort, reason-based choice becomes impossible. It is noteworthy the large measure
in which this implies an ideas-centered account. Ideas—or correlated concepts such
as learning or knowledge—frame and permeate choices. Ideas set into motion
actions, ideas give solutions, but they also generate new problems and challenges.
Ideas are present at different levels: ideas on possibilities, ideas on rules, ideas on
institutions. Ultimately, an account of human societies is fundamentally an account
of the social avatars of ideas and knowledge, manifested through choices. That is to
say that at the most fundamental level, understanding the nature of institutions is
rooted in understanding the role of ideas, and knowledge in the human condition.
Everything pivots around them because everything pivots on choice. Or, the other
way round, it pivots on choice because it pivots on ideas.
3.2 Institutions—Bulwarks Against the “Threat of Chaos” and the “Threat of Tyranny”
This is the background on which one could read V. Ostrom’s (1973, 1982) inter-
pretation of institutions as responses or solutions to generic challenges or “threats.”
Let us take a step further with a brief look at such two key challenges: the “threat of
potential chaos” and the “threat of tyranny.”
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We have already seen how new ideas, free will, learning, and imagination, as
intrinsic elements of human nature, do come with the price of generating an ongoing
“threat of potential chaos.” The future course of human development is always
influenced by the generation of new knowledge. New knowledge opens new pos-
sibilities; and challenges more often than not the status quo—it has destabilizing
effects. Increasing the potential variety in human behavior, the multitude of combi-
nations, combinations of combinations and patterns of interactions, threatens with
chaos the maintenance of a predictable order (V. Ostrom, 1982, p. 18). Hence, the
paradox that choice requires constraints:
Mechanisms for ordering or constraining choices must simultaneously occur
if human development is to advance beyond a most primitive level. The
development of order out of chaos requires that each human being establish
a basis for anticipating how others will behave so that each person can act
with an expectation that other persons will act with constraint. (V. Ostrom,
1982, p. 19)
The basis for anticipating others’ behavior is what one calls a “social rule.” Rules
are the mechanism constraining and ordering choice and, thus, “a necessary condi-
tion, but not a sufficient condition, for establishing ordered social relationships.” They
are the magic that transforms and stabilizes that potential chaos coming from the
fundamental unpredictability of human nature and human ideas. Out of the range of
potential diversity, individuals are constrained from exploiting all possibilities and
are limited in their choice to a smaller range of possibilities. Consequently, human
behavior can be surprisingly predictable in the presence of relevant decision rules.
Yet, the very existence (and necessity) of rules introduces a new challenge or
threat: the “threat of tyranny.” Social order depends on human agents who have the
task to formulate, determine, and enforce rules. But that creates drastic asymmetries
between those agents and the rest. Rules, thus, by their very nature, generate two
social types: the rulers and the ruled. It looks like it is unavoidable that collective
action and social order imply “organized inequalities in the management of inter-
dependent rule-ordered behavior.” Therefore, it is fair to conclude that the most
fundamental source of inequalities in human societies is the inevitable use of rules to
order social relationships (V. Ostrom, 1982, pp. 22–23; 1984, 1986).
The problem is amplified by the fact that ruled-based order depends on the use
of sanctions. That means that social order “not only requires an assigning of author-
ity to those who govern but also requires giving them the right to use coercion.”
Therefore, as social beings, humans are forced to “accept coercion as use of instru-
ments of evil to permit orderly social relationships.” The ubiquity of coercion means
that in the final count, order and organization in human societies “depend upon a
Faustian bargain where the use of instruments of evil, i.e., sanctions, including those
of organized force, become necessary conditions for deriving the advantages of
social organization” (V. Ostrom, 1982, p. 2). That is undoubtedly introducing a tragic
element in human condition. What V. Ostrom calls a “Faustian bargain” is inevitably
ensuing from the “tensions which arise from efforts to give force and effect to words
and ideas in structuring human relationships.”
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This condition makes a Faustian bargain of human societies; and no one can
escape from the burden of using such instruments of evil to do good. [. . .]
We are all intricately bound in a Faustian bargain which we as human beings
cannot avoid. At most, we can attempt to understand the fundamental ten-
sions that are inherent in such a bargain and conduct ourselves accordingly.
We are all potential tyrants unless we learn to act justly. (V. Ostrom, 1982,
p. 35)
To sum up, social order and its institutional dynamics are seen as shaped by (and
operating under) the shadow of the ongoing tension between the “threat of chaos”
and the “threat of tyranny.” Force and political constraint can be used as “instruments
of tyranny as well as instruments to support productive and mutually advantageous
relationships.” Could the problem of elemental asymmetry in the relationship
between the “rulers” and the “ruled” be dealt in any way? Does, by its very nature,
social order require that someone rules over society and cannot be held accountable to
other members of society? Is it possible to conceptualize and organize the relationship
between rulers and ruled so that rulers themselves are subject to a rule of law? In other
words, could we design a “meta-level rule of law” where rulers themselves are subject
to enforceable rules? Could we encapsulate it creating a climate dominated by
deliberation and critical reason tempering the rulers and the application of force by
checking and balancing them not only with the force of rules but also with reason and
deliberation. The very effort of specifying such a solution is a means to appreciate the
deep tensions that are involved in establishing a system of governance where both the
“threat of chaos” and the “threat of tyranny” are circumvented. We are already in
the territory of the “science and art of self-governance.”
3.3 Institutions as Knowledge Processes
Even a preliminary overview of this second dimension of the social philosophy
of the Bloomington school reveals a significant departure from the polycentricity–
Public Choice perspective presented in the first part of the article. First of all, to
introduce explicitly and unabashedly a moral problem—good and evil—is not the
typical thing in standard institutional analysis and even less so in Public Choice. In
some of his writings, V. Ostrom’s paradoxes, Faustian bargains, dilemmas of human
condition, etc. sound like the repertoire of an existentialist philosophy of the tragic.
But behind and beyond it, the argument leads to a problem of knowledge, and to a
theory of knowledge processes. The knowledge (both practical and theoretical)—the
“science and art”—to devise rules and meta-rules and to support their operation by
force, deliberation, and reason, is the pivotal element of the vision. Knowledge and
learning are stabilizers of social order and drivers of social change. Social order, in
the end, is nothing less than a huge knowledge process. Yet, although the argument
sounds Hayekian, the nuances and differences are significant. To illustrate that point,
let us take a brief look at two other “threats” discussed by V. Ostrom as parts of this
philosophy of institutional order: the “threat of uncertainty” and the “threat of
ignorance and error.”
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We have already discussed the thesis that as human capabilities for learning and
communication increase, as new knowledge increases, that has the effect of disrupt-
ing existing or established relationships as well as the expectations about the future
based on them. It is one thing to hope that more knowledge will reduce that
uncertainty and something else to realize that while new knowledge may reduce
uncertainty in some areas, it may increase it in many others. One needs to know not
only how to reduce uncertainty in specific domains but also how to manage it in the
aggregate.
One way would be simply to block the advent of the growth of new knowledge
in the society. In this case, routines based on specific and meticulous prescriptions
for each activity become the norm. However, there is a second possibility, and this
one is of most interest to the institutional theorist: designing rules and institutional
arrangements that leave open to choice an entire range of learning and actions and
at the same time try to channel them in the most beneficial way. The domain of
learning should be understood in broad terms. For instance, learning takes place in
market through prices—profit and loss—that signal the direction in which resources
are best directed. In a similar way, learning takes place through organizational
experiments, failure, and success. The principle of bankruptcy in the legal system
helps society to deal with failed organizational experiments. The list of examples of
rule systems that administer knowledge and implicitly manage uncertainty could
continue. The point is clear: the solution is not to try to block the knowledge process
but to work with it through institutional means.
The problem of knowledge and its uses in society highlights an additional issue
(Ostrom, 1982, p. 34; 1973, 1990a, 1991b, 1991c). Social order increases and intensifies
the division of labor, which leads to better use of skills and knowledge in society. But
at the same time, it leads, by definition, to specialization, and specialization in a
particular domain has a cost: the lack of specialization in others. If one defines the
issue in cognitive terms, then one may conclude that relative knowledge brings
relative ignorance, “the limited mastery that each individual can attain in relation to
the aggregate pool of knowledge” (V. Ostrom, 1982, p. 31). In other words, while the
division of labor increases the overall level of knowledge in a society, it also increases
the relative ignorance of its individual members. Adam Smith (1981 [1776], pp.
734–735) in The Wealth of Nations was among the first to identify this downside, or
“perverse effect” of the division of labor. Specialization means coming to know more
and more about less and less. Note that the threat of relative ignorance is not limited
to the undereducated or to physical laborers. It is a general or structural problem
deriving from specialization of any type of knowledge and/or any type of division
of labor.
In brief, individuals are necessarily limited in their capacity to master large
bodies of knowledge. As the aggregate pool of knowledge increases, the relative
ignorance of each individual about that aggregate pool of knowledge will also
increase. The implications are two-fold. The first is cognitive. The more complex the
institutional order, the deeper the division of labor; the deeper the division of labor,
the less one single person can “see” or “know” the “whole picture.” Out of that
emerges a second implication—an operational one. In the circumstances created by
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a permanent dynamic limit to our knowledge, all decision making could be subject
to error. Hence, all decision makers are fallible. “No decision maker can know all of
the consequences that flow from his decision and actions. A proneness to error will
plague all human efforts” (V. Ostrom, 1982, p. 32; 1973, 1990, 1991b). Needless to say,
that conclusion converges with the conclusions of previous arguments surrounding
the discussions of the other “threats.”
We could now move to the final stage of our overview. Based on the discussion
of the “threats” we are now in the position to highlight two noteworthy sets of
corollaries that round up and nuance our view of the second facet of the social
philosophy of the Bloomington School.
The first set of corollaries starts with the observation that the salient place of
knowledge and learning implies a similar place for error, ignorance, and fallibility.
One could make a step further: there is a relationship between accepting a vision
of the limits of individual and human knowledge and accepting the necessity of an
open, pluralist, and polycentric political system functioning on the basis of dis-
persed knowledge. Alternatively, there is a relationship between assuming the per-
spective of an “omniscient leader” and believing in the viability of monocentrism,
centralism, and comprehensive social planning. One could thus start to see how
the two facets of the Bloomington social theory may be linked or at least how they
resonate with each other. Decision makers and analysts, writes V. Ostrom, who
assume that “they can take the perspective of an omniscient observer,” that they
can “see” the “whole picture,” are always a potential source of troubles. Their
solutions or decisions will increase the predisposition to error, not to speak of the
fact that their perception of their own capabilities may invite a tyrannical behavior.
In monocentric systems, this property is exponentially more dangerous—in fact is
self-reinforcing.
Those who have recourse to the perspectives of “omniscient” observers in
assessing contemporary problems, also rely on political solutions which
have recourse to some single center of authority where officials can exercise
omnipotent decision-making capabilities and dealing with the aggregate
problems of a society [. . .] Somebody who takes the perspective of an omni-
scient observer will assume that he can “see” the “whole picture, “know”
what is “good” for people, and plan or pre-determine the future course of
events. Such a presumption is likely to increase proneness to error. Fallible
men require reference to decision-making processes where diverse forms of
analysis can be mobilized and where each form of analysis can be subject to
critical scrutiny of other analysts and decision-makers. (V. Ostrom, 1973)
This way of framing the “threat of ignorance” brings to the fore another facet of
institutions and another insight into the nature of the “science and art of politics.” If
a society accepts that all decision makers are fallible, then it recognizes the need to
create institutional bulwarks against error. That is to say, it responds to the necessity
of reducing error proneness by building “error-correcting procedures in the organi-
zation of decision-making processes” (V. Ostrom, 1982, p. 32; 1973, 1990). These
error-correcting procedures are nothing else than organizational and institutional
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processes aimed at facilitating and speeding up the rate of learning. Learning is the
quintessence of error-fighting mechanisms. Correcting errors is part of a learning
process. In this respect, systems of organization, including systems of government,
can ultimately be viewed as arrangements that either facilitate or stifle opportunities
for learning to occur (V. Ostrom, 1982, pp. 31–32; 1973; E. Ostrom, Gardner, &
Walker, 1994). This is a simple thesis with very interesting implications for the ways
we think of institutional performance.
The second set of corollaries build on the observation that a “science of rules” is
crucial for a functional social order. The notion that in order to survive and flourish,
social order requires rules able to cope with uncertainty has an ineluctable implica-
tion. The idea has already been mentioned: one needs the knowledge of rules or “a
science of rules.” Such knowledge, writes V. Ostrom, should “enable us to under-
stand how rules constrain choice and affect behavior in ways that are likely to
generate social pathologies under changing conditions of interdependency.” At the
same time, such knowledge might then be used to change rules and create new
patterns of behavior to avoid those “pathologies.” If orderly change is to occur, he
continues, “advances in human knowledge about institutional analysis and design
must accompany the generation of those other forms of new knowledge which
enable human beings to manipulate nature and alter the structures of events” (V.
Ostrom, 1982, pp. 27–29; 1971, 1992). Maintaining a complex and functional order
requires an ongoing investment in the study of rules, institutions, and institutional
design principles. Seen in this context, the IAD framework is to be understood as a
contribution to this effort. Its cognitive and heuristic content is an ingredient of the
larger pool of “human knowledge about institutional analysis and design” that we
need in the race to keep up with the growth of other types of knowledge and the
“threats” they pose.
In brief, the overview of the “threats” illustrates the tenuous and volatile nature
of social order as an extension of the human condition “plagued by critical tensions”
(V. Ostrom, 1982, p. 33; 1973). The human capability for learning poses a “threat of
chaos.” The solution to that threat implies a “Faustian bargain” in which human
beings are required to “use instruments of evil to advance their joint good.” The
threat of chaos and the creation of order from chaos, in turn, pose a “threat of
tyranny” while in parallel the amplification of human capabilities for learning,
necessarily increases the “threat of uncertainty.” These threats are compounded by a
“threat of increasing relative ignorance” that accompanies the modern growth of
new knowledge. To sum up, once the crucial tension between learning and con-
straints, ideas and rules is projected as a background, and once the complexity and
diversity of the attempts of human beings to organize and find solutions to unavoid-
able threats generated by the very human condition are considered, a deeper per-
spective on the institutional and political order is opened. This is a perspective that
does not shy away, using epistemological or methodological excuses, to recognize
the existential significance of the notions of tragic, dilemma, tyranny, ignorance, and
error. In fact it is for the first time that institutionalist authors take seriously the other
facet of notions like “the tragedy of the commons” or “dilemmas of social coopera-
tion.” Emphasizing “dilemma” and “tragedy,” as opposed to, or at least as much as,
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“commons” and “social cooperation,” reminds us that there is more than meets the
eye even in the most familiar conceptual models we use to analyze and interpret
social reality. Irrespective of what one may think of what a social philosophy or social
theory should look like, the perspective offered by the Bloomington School is an
unquestionably powerful and profound piece of intellectual work.
4. Summing Up: Questions and Challenges
We have now a clearer view of the two dimensions of what we have called the
“social philosophy” associated with the Bloomington School of Institutional Analy-
sis. Once familiarized with them, the first questions that come to mind are: in what
measure are these two facets consistent with each other? Are they connected or
connectible by a clear-cut logic? Are they convergent, divergent, or simply parallel?
Such questions are, no doubt, legitimate. On the one hand, is a perspective close
to the Public Choice tradition but deviating from it, among others, in the role given
to the ideas and belief systems of social actors as well as to the “situational logic” or
“ecological rationality” defining the actions of those actors. Built around the concept
of “polycentricity,” this perspective is a challenge to two of the deepest assumptions
of political and economic sciences of the twentieth century: the monocentric
vision of social order and the “market” vs. “state” dichotomy. On the other hand, is
the outline of a social theory built around a view of social order seen as a knowledge
and learning process, and bolstered by a series of observations about the human
condition, fallibility, coercion, and error and their role in creating and undermining
institutional order. The shift of emphasis to learning and knowledge as main drivers
of social change and the use of notions heavy of intellectual history, such as “human
condition” or “Faustian bargain” signals a departure even further from the main-
stream. However, unorthodox as they both are, no one could deny that each presents
the student with its own, different angle on institutional order and its interpretation.
For instance, on the other hand, we have a perspective in which institutional diver-
sity is a function of a formally constructed taxonomy of goods—public, private,
common—in which the nature of goods more or less shapes the institutional struc-
ture, including that of the polycentric order. On the other hand, we have a perspec-
tive in which institutions are seen primarily in the light of fluid, volatile, and difficult
to formalize knowledge and decision processes. The many functions institutions
have (in order to meet the multitude of challenges they are supposed to be a response
to) create institutional patterns that seem to defy the simplicity and rigidity of more
typical conceptualizations. A rapid look at the variety and complexity of institutional
solutions emerging in history as a response to the “threat of uncertainty” is sufficient
to illustrate the point.
In brief, even a cursory overview confirms that the two social philosophies of the
Bloomington school are different enough to give good reason for asking questions
about their compatibility. That is why the first problem that comes to mind is not that
of the differences between them but the question: Different as they may be, is there
a structural—logical or theoretical—link between them? Addressing this question
on the spot is very tempting. Indeed, once that is done, two solutions immediately
Aligica/Boettke: Ostroms’ Institutionalism 45
offer themselves as possible responses. The first would be to say that the two
perspectives address two different levels of analysis. One could make reference in
this respect to E. Ostrom’s own argument that explanations have to occur at multiple
levels, hence the task is (i) to identify the appropriate level of analysis relevant to
addressing a particular puzzle, and (ii) to learn or to build the appropriate language
for understanding that level and one or two levels above and beyond the focal point
(E. Ostrom, 1986, 1990, 1997, 2005; E. Ostrom et al., 1994). Taking advantage of the
argument developed by her, one could simply translate it by making the point that
they apply to these social philosophy frameworks too. The two social philosophies
are visions of different levels, each addressing particular puzzles regarding the
institutional reality.
Yet, as much one may wish to make it fade away, we are still left with a problem.
Different languages may lead to different approaches and even more important, to
different truth claims, some of them contradicting each other. In the end, to avoid the
impression that anything goes, it may still be necessary either to show how the two
are logically and theoretically linked or to confront directly an even more basic
problem: Is it really necessary to have them (logically and consistently) linked at all?
If finding some principle of consistency is unavoidable, then a meta-level conceptual
construction is inevitable. And this approach (that represents in fact the second
solution) seems inescapable because even if we assume a modular, multi-faceted
approach, one still needs to offer an account and a coherence criterion for the various
truth claims introduced by the various perspectives, from various levels.
The effort to explore the possibility of a “third” social philosophy that operates
as a meta-level framework above the two discussed in this article is undoubtedly
worthy. Yet the real dimensions and the significance of this and other similar efforts
could be fully understood only if we take a look at the entire picture and at the entire
range of questions and challenges revealed by an investigation into the two social
philosophies of the Bloomington institutionalism and their relevance. The point is
that if we look from a broader perspective, we realize that the issues of how consis-
tent the two facets are and of how we reinforce that consistency, are important
because they are leading us to a deeper and larger set of insights. It becomes clearer
that the focus shifts from the relationship between the two philosophies toward their
relationship with the rest of the research program. How consistent are the two
(separately or in conjunction) with the rest of the program? How important are they
for the unity, identity, and completeness of the school of thought advanced by the
Ostroms? We know, for instance, that what we called “social philosophy” ideas are
an easily identifiable part of the history of their work. As such they are part of, so to
speak, the genealogy of E. Ostrom’s recent and widely praised empirical work. We
also know that in the minds of the Ostroms, these more foundational and general
ideas and the more applied, empirical, and theoretical agenda were coexisting. They
saw a link, a continuity between them; they were considered to be part of a larger
whole.
But the fact that, at one point or another, the Ostroms hold these views, or that
they saw them connected—part of a system of thought—does not imply that those
ideas are truly consistent in a philosophical or epistemological sense with each other
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or with the rest of the research program. Whether they are intrinsic pieces of a larger
and coherent system is yet to be determined. And that task is not so much an effort
of discovery but an effort of construction. The fact that a genealogical approach could
document and trace back some theoretical insights (or some pieces of empirical
research) to a social philosophy, is not a test of consistency. The genesis of some of the
governance and CPR theories (the Popperian “context of discovery”) may be linked
to a certain social philosophy. One could see specific conjectures and hypotheses
emerging from a broader vision. But it is also conceivable that something like the
CPR agenda, once articulated, may have taken a life of its own. And thus, once
established, it goes on to subsist independently of the initial social philosophy vision
that created the conditions for its emergence. That is to say, once established as a
scientific agenda, one may simply kick off the philosophical ladder. After that, all is
a matter of just formulating testable hypotheses and falsifying them using impartial,
value-free methodological devices.
At this point we could see more clearly the dimensions and relevance of this
discussion about social philosophy (and its place in the Ostroms’ version of institu-
tionalism). The issue cuts at the core of the Bloomington research program. We
understand that as such, it was unavoidable to address it in the context of this or any
other discussion about the past, present, or future of this School. In the end, our
overview of the social philosophy of the Bloomington institutionalism has left us
with an impressive set of challenging questions. What is the relationship between the
two social philosophies and the rest of the Bloomington research program, especially
as developed in relationship to the recent empirical agenda? Does the more salient
and well known dimension of the agenda really imply (or require) the social phi-
losophies? What is the relationship between the two social philosophies and the
analytical tools—such as the IAD framework—developed by the Ostroms and their
associates? Or any social philosophy at all? How necessary is a social philosophy
once the program is fully functional in its empirical dimension? Is a preoccupation
with social philosophy adding to or distracting from the further development of the
School? What is the relationship between the two social philosophies? Should the
Bloomington agenda be really concerned with their further development? Could it
go ahead and advance without them? Why both? Why engage in a meta-level effort
to unite them? What if only one of them could function pretty well by itself, as a
social theory basis for the empirical, theoretical, and applied agenda?
Last, but not least, are the normative assumptions and implications that have not
even been touched in this article but that are nonetheless of paramount importance.
We have seen that the Ostroms’ institutionalism is infused with a profound trust in
human creativity, ingenuity, and ability to self-organize as well as with a deep
presumption in favor of human freedom. These are part and parcel of both social
philosophies; they are not and could not be contained by abstract analytical models
or by value-neutral methodological devices. Hence a question: What would happen
if the normative dimension is removed from the Bloomington perspective? How
would that affect the future of the School, its agenda, and its relevance?
These and other similar questions seem to challenge in unexpected and pro-
found ways our thinking about the Ostroms and their work. They compel us to see
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their endeavor as a remarkable invitation to a work in progress, to a real intellectual
workshop where our task is not only one of discovery and interpretation of estab-
lished facts and ideas, but also (and even more important) one of intellectual con-
struction and creativity. In the end, this is the essence of the Elinor and Vincent
Ostrom challenge to us. A challenge we are yet to respond to.
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